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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
METROPOLITAN WATER
l)ISTRICT OF PROVO CITY,
a public corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
PR()\r() RIVER WATER
USERS ASSOCIATION,
a corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
10,000

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF CASE
This is an action to determine as between respondent (plaintiff) ·and appellant (defendant)
which is entitled to the interest and income derived
from the investment of $6,000.00 paid by respondent to appellant on December 2, 1946 necessary
and preparatory to the execution of an Amendatory·
Stock Subscription Contract between respondent
and appellant dated February 3, 1947 whereby the
original contract under which respondent subscribed for stock in appellant corporation was amended
to increase the maximum indebtedness of respondent to appellant.
.-\ppellant contends th~at the $6,000.00 was a
1
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payment to appellant on the purchase price of the
stock, thereby reducing by $6,000.00 respondent's
then existing indebtedness to appellant as expressly
recited in the Amendatory Subscription Contract,
and thereupon the $6,000.00 became the absolute
property of appellant and any interest earned on
the investment thereof likewise belongs to appellant.
Respondent contends that the $6,000.00 was delivered to appellant upon a mutual understanding
that the proceeds would be held and invested by
appellant until such time as payments to the United
States would become due under appellant's contract
with the United States and that the interest derived
from such investment should accrue to the credit
of the respondent.
DISPOSITION BY TRIAL COURT
'The trial court foun·d that the $6,000.00 was
delivered to appellant upon a mutual understanding
that the same would be invested and the interest
derived therefrom would accrue to respondent, and
held that the respondent was entitled to the income
and interest derived from such investment, both
past and future, an·d ordered appell!ant to
1

(a) keep the $6,000.00 invested at the
highest rate of interest consistent with safety;
(b) pay the $6,000.00 over to the
United States when the first payment shall
become due to the United States from appel1ant under a supplemental contract between
2
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appellant and the United States, and to give
respondent credit therefor on its indebtedness
to appellant; and
(c) give respondent credit for all interest and income derived from the investment of the $6,000.00 on any payment, whether classed as installments, assessments or
otherwise, which may hereafter ·become due
to appellant from respondent under their
amendatory subscription contract.
RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANT
By this ~appeal appellant seeks a reversal of the
decision of the trial court by setting aside the Fin~d
ings Of Fact, Conclusions 'Of Law and Judgment
entered and directing the entry ·of new Findings Of
Fact, Conclusions Of Law and Judgment adjudging

(a) that the $6,000.00 was 'a payment
by respondent to appellant on the purchase
price of the stock an·d that the indebtedness
of respondent to appellant under its stock subscription contract with appellant W1as thereby reduce(d by the sum of $6,000.00;
(b) that the $6,000.00 became and is
the property of appellant, and appellant is
entitled to all interest and income derived
from the investment thereof; :and
(c) that the respondent ~has no claim
or right to the interest or income derived
from the investment of the $6,000.00.
3
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-Respondent is a metropolitan water
district organized and existin'g under the provisions
of what is now Chapter 8, Title 7·3, Utah Code An..
notated 1'9'53. Defendant-Appellant is a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State
of Utah primarily for the purpose of contracting
with the United States of America for the repayment of ~he cost of construction of the Deer Creek
Division of the Provo River Project and for the
operation (and maintenance thereof. Respondent is
one of the subscribers of stock of appellant corporation.
To accomplish its purpose appellant entered
into a series of written contracts with the United
States of America, acting through its Bureau of
Rec]amation. Under the terms of the original contract dated June 27, 1936 (Pl. Exh. 2), as amended
on July 3, 1937 (Pl. Exh. 3), the United States in
substance agreed to expend up to $7,600,000.00 towards the construction of the Project, which appellant agreed to repay without interest in forty equal
~annual installments (Fdg. 3- R. 119, 120; Pl Exh.
2, par. '1'7).
On September 18, 193'7 respondent and appellant entered into a stock subscription contract whereby respondent subscribed for eight thousand (8,000)
shares of stock of appellant corporation and agreed
to pay appellant therefor the full purchase price
thereof, which was defined as that proportion of
4
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the total sums and charges required to be paid by
appellant to the United States that the eight thousand (8,000) shares bears to the total number of
shares outstanding ( 100,000) ; provided, however,
that the total purchase price shall not exceed the
sum of ·$608,000.00 (eight percent of $7,600,000.00)
(Fdg. 4 - R. '1'20; Pl. Ex·h. 4, par. 8, 9, 15). In
addition ·thereto respon'dent agreed to pay appe'll,ant
a proportionate share of the default of the other
stockholders; provided, however, that respondent's
proportionate s·hare thereof would not exceed
$212,800.00 (Pl. Exh. 4, par. 15). 'The payments
were to be made by respondent when assessed by
appellant in order that appellant could make its
payments to the United States ( Pl. Exh. 4, par. 8).
Respondent fur~her agreed to pay 1appellant the
assessments levie'd for respondent's share of the general corporate expenses and expenses of the operation
and maintenance of the Project (Pl. Exh. 4, par.
1

1-!).

In 1946 it became 1apparent that the expenditure of $7,600,000.00 by the United Sta:tes would
not be sufficient to complete the Project. N egotiations were then undertaken with the United States
towards a supplemental contract under which the
United States would commit itself to expend ·a total
of $11,400,000.00 towards the construction of the
Project, which :appellant would repay in forty equal
annual installments (Fdg. 5, Tr. 1'20).
To accomplish that objective it became neces5
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sary for the subscribers of appellant's stock either
(a) to amend their respective subscription contracts
and thereby increase their respective indebtednesses
to appellant to secure payment of the additional
indebtedness by the appellant to the United States
or (b) to proportionately reduce their respective
amounts of stock subscribed for (Tr. 36, 37). All
of the subscribers, including respondent, elected to
amend their respective subscription contracts :and
proportionately assume the additional indebtedness
to appellant. However, the additional obligation for
which respondent would thereby become indebted
to appellant would exceed its debt limitation as
fixed ·by the then existing Section 100-10-18 (g),
Utah Code Annotated 1943 by the sum of $6,000.00
(Complaint par. 6 - R. 4, 5; Tr. 37, 107, 109; Fdg.
6- R. 121).
On November 20, 1946 respondent adopted an
Ordinance declaring that the interest of respondent
required the execution of the Amendatory Subscription ·Contract and calling for an election of the qualified electorate of the respondent District to vote
thereon. 'The Ordinance contained verbatim the
language of the entire proposed Amendlatory Subscription ·Con tract ( Df. Exh. 24) .
·On December 2, 1946, being two days prior to
ilie election, respondent ·delivered to appellant respondent's check in the sum of $6,000.00 (Fdg. 7R. 121; Pl. Exh. '7).
6
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The election by the qualified voters of the respondent District was held on December 4, 1946
and the proposed Amendatory Subscription Contract was approved by !a majority of the votes cast
(Df. Exh. 25, p. 3).
On December 20, 1946 appellant entered into
a supplemental contract with the United States
(Pl. Exh. 5) under the terms of which the United
States agreed to expend a total of $11,400,000.00
in the construction of the Proje'Ct and appellant
agreed to pay to the United States the cost thereof,
\vithout interest, not to exceed $'11,400,000.00 (Pl.
Exh. 5, pa1·. 7). Payments were to be m1ade in forty
equal annual installments, the first of which would
become due and payable on January t5 of the year
following six months' notice from the 'Secretary
of Interior that the $11,400,000.00 have been expended or that the works were ready for use (Pl.
Exh. 5, par. 9).
On February 3, 194 7 respondent ~and appellant
entered into an Amendatory Subscription Contract
(Pl. Exh. 6) wherein paragraph 15 of the original
Subscription Contract (Pl. Exh. 4) was amended
to read as follows:
u15. Anything herein to the contr:ary
notwithstanding, it is agreed that the total
aggregate liability of the District for payment under the terms of this contract
"(a) To the Association (appellant),
for the purch:ase price of the stock of the District (respondent) in the Association shall
7
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not exceed the sum of $912,000, less $6,000
previously paid by the District to the Association on the purchase price of said stock;
and
''(b) To the Association, on account of
the default of some other stockholders in the
payment of ~he purchase price of the stock
of such other stockholders in the Association
shall not exceed the sum of $319;200."
None of the previous contr:acts between the appellant and the United States obligated the United
States to complete the ·Project so on February 2,
194:9 appellant entered into a further contract in
writin,g with the United States whereby the United
States agreed, among other things, to expend such
sums of money in excess of $11,400,000.00 ras may
be necessary to complete the Project and appellant
agreed to use the Project water supply and facilities
an·d to pay therefor annual rates as fixed by the
United S;tates ('Fdg. 5 - R. 120) 'The United ·states
agreed to suspend the equal annual installment payments on the ·$11,400,000.00 required under the
Supplemental Contract ·(Pl. Exh. 5) until the expenditures in excess thereof made by the United
·states have been paid in full by the appellant to the
United 'S·ta:tes.
None of the payments provided for in the
$11,400,000.00 ·contract between appellant and the
United States has become due or payable by appellant to the United States and no payment thereunder
will become due until after the expenditures on the
8

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Project in excess of $11,400,000.00 have been repaid
by appellant to the United States, which will not
occur until several years in the future (Fdg. 5 R. 121). No contract exists between the respondent
District and the United States pertaining to this

Project.
The $6,000.00 paid by respon·dent to appellant
was invested by appellant in government bonds on
or about the first part of May, 1947, and the interest earned thereon ·as of December 31, 1961 was
$~,2·58.9'2, which has been re-invested by the appellant (Fdg.11-R.122).
On February 5, 194·7, being two days after the
execution of the Amendatory Subscription Contrla.ct,
a resolution was unanimously adopted by all of the
stockholders of appellant corporation, in·cluding respondent, providing that the $6,000.00 paid to appellant by respondent be credited to the account of
respondent on its contr1actual obligation for the purchase of stock in the appellant corporation, and that
the $6,000.00 be deducted from the first contract
·assessments (Df. Exh. 29, p. 3). On M·arch 14, 1947,
being six weeks after the execution of the Amendatory Subscription Contract, a motion was passed by
the Board of Directors of appellant corporation
providing that the $6,000.00 paid to appellant by
respondent not be mingled witfu the appellant's general funds, but th1at it be placed in a separate account and invested at the highest rate of interest
consistent with safety with the interest on the in9
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vestment to accrue to the credit of respondent (Fdg.
10- R. 12'2; Pl. Exh. 1, p. 3).
From 1947 to 1960, inclusive, the auditor's reports on appellant's books s'how that the '$6,000.00,
together with interest accruals, was credited to the
stock subscription account of respondent (Fdgs. 12,
13 - R. 12·2, 123). In 1961 the !auditor's report was
changed to show that the $6,000.00, together with
interest accruals, was credited to the general stockholders equity account (Df. Exh. 23, p. 4; Tr. 88,
89).
No question arose with respect to the interest
accruals on the investment of the $6,000.00 until
March 1'1, 1955, at whieh time director Harris advised the 'Board of Directors of appellant corporation that such moneys belonged to the appellant
and would have to remain with appellant until
the first payment is made on the subscription contract debt (Tr. 14; Pl. Exh. 8, p. 2). The issue arose
again on April 8, 1'960, at which time director Har-ris again !advised that the $6,000.00 was a payment
on respondent's subscription contract debt and the
return of the bon·ds would, therefore, constitute a
gift (Df. Exh. 30, p. 1). Finally, at the Board of
Directors' meeting of appellant held on April 20,
1962 a motion was passed, as 1amended on May 18,
196'2, declaring that the interest accruals on the investment of the $6,000.00 are the property of appellant and that respondent ha·d no interest therein
(Pl. Ex·h. 21, p. 5). Ther~after this suit was com1

to
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menced on August 24, 1962 and was tried on June
25, 1963 to the court sitting without a jury, the
Honorable Joseph E. Nelson presiding.
The trial court found that the $6,000.00 check
was delivered to appellant on December 2, 1946
upon a mutual understanding that the proceeds
would be held and invested by !appellant until such
time as payments to the United States would be required under appellant's contract with the United
States and under the then proposed Amendatory
Subscription Contract between respondent and appellant, 'and that the interest received from such investment would accrue to the credit of respondent
(Fdg. 7 - R. 121). It then concluded that appellant
holds the $6,000.00 for the sole purpose of paying
the same over to the United States when, as and if
annual installments on the $11,400,000.00 to be paid
to the United States by appellant commence under
the contract between appellant and the United States
(·Concl. 1 - R. 12'3). The trial court entered its
Judgment ordering appellant to keep the said
$6,000.00 invested at the ·highest rate of interest
consistent with safety and to pay the sam'e over to
the United States when the first payment shall become due to the United 'States from appellant under
the $11,400,000.00 contract. It then adjudged that
the interest and dividends heretofore an'd ·hereafter
received by appellant attributable to the investm·ent
of the $6,000.00, including interest on interest, are
the property of the respondent (Judgment- R. 125,
126).
11
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With such Findings, Conclusions and Judgment
appellant strongly disagrees and urges that there is
no competent evidence in the record to support such
Findings an·d th1at the Conclusions and Judgment
are 'Contrary to law. Wha:t is more, the trial court
then ordered appellant to give respondent credit
for all interest on any payments, whether classed
as installments, 1assessments or otherwise, which may
hereafter become due appellant by respondent under
its stock subscription contract (Judgment - R.
126). In so doing the trial court awarded respondent relief beyond that to which respondent was
entitled or claimed under the pleadings or proof.
Appellant filed its Motion For New !Trial, specifically pointing out the errors of law committed
by the trial court (R. 133, 134) and filed its Motion
To Alter Fin.dings Of Fact, Conclusions :Qf Law and
Judgment, specifying in detail the amendments
necessary to conform to the evidence and law of
this case (R. 12;7-132, incl.). On September 13, 1963
the court entered its Order denying ·appellant's Motion To Alter Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law
and Ju:dgment and Motion For New Trial (R. 137).
On October '7, 1963 appellant filed its Noti·ce Of Appea1'herein (R. 138).
ST~TEMEN·T OF POINTS

I.
THE DELIVERY OF RES PONDENT'S CHECK IN
THE SUM OF $6,000.00 TO APPELLANT C'ONSTITUTED A v~ouNTARY .A:ND UNCONDITION'AL PAYMENT
ON RES'PONDENT'S INDE BTEDNESS TO APPEL~poiNT

1

1

12
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LANT, AND OWNERS'HlP THEREOF HAD TO PASS
TO APPELLANT IN ORDER THAT THE INDE·BTEDNESS WOULD THEREBY BE REDUCED BY $6,000.00.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RE'CEIVING EVIDENCE OF CONVERSATIONS PRE-DATING THE
AMENDATORY SUBS'CRIPTION CONTRA!CT OF FEBRlTARY 3, 1947 WHICH TENDED TO ALTER AND
MODIFY THE TERMS THERE 0F IN VIOLATION '0·F
THE P.AROL EVIDENCE RULE.
1

'POINT III.
THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COU'RT THAT
THE $6,000.00 WAS CONDITIONALLY DELIVERED
TO APPELLANT UPON A MUTU~L UN'DERSTANDING THAT THE SAME WOULD BE INVE·S'TED AND
THE IN'TEREST RE,CEIVED FR 0M SUC'H INVEST1\lENT 'rOULD ~CCRUE TO RESPONDENT OR THAT
APPELLAN'T WAS BOUND THERE'BY.
1

POINT. IV.
THE CLAIMED O'RAL AGREEMENT WO·UIJD BE
VOID AS BEING AN IIJLEGAL C·ONTRACT TO VIOL.ATE THE PROVISIONS OF THE THE·N EXISTING
SECTION 100~10-18 (g), UTAH CODE ANNO·TATE'D
1943, AND THE TRIAL COURT E RRED IN ITS C·ONCLUSIO·NS AND J'UDGMENT IN ENFORCING THE
SAME.
POINT V.
THE CLAIMED ORAL A·GREEME·NT WOULD
NlTLLIFY THE ELECTION O·F THE VOTERS OF RESPONDENT DISTRICT HELD ON DECEMBER 4, 1946
TO APPROVE THE PRO:POS'ED AMENDA'TORY SUBSCRIPTION CONTRACT AND WOUI. . D VOID THE
.AMENDATORY SUBSCRIPTION ·CONTRACT DATEID
FEBRUARY 3, 1947 AND THE EXECUTION THERE1

OF.
13
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POINT VI.
RE'S'PONDENT ACQUIRED N·o RIGHTS IN AND
TO THE INTE'REST ACCRUALS FROM 'THE INVESTME'NT OF THE $6,000.00 PAYMENT BY REASON OF
THE M'OTION PASSED AT THE A'PPE'LLANT DIRECTO·RS' MEE'TING o·F MAROH 14, 1947.
POINT VII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING FINDI'NGS OF F .ACT NOS. 9 TO 14, IN·CLUSIVE, AS 'TO
E·VENTS SUBSEQUENT ·To THE EXECUTION OF
THE AMENDATORY S'UB:SCRIPTI'ON CONTRACT BETWEE'N 'THE PARTIES DA'TED FEBRUARY 3, 1947.
POIN·T VIII.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS JU'D·GMENT BY
GRANTING RE:UIEF TO RES~PONDENT BEYOND
TH'AT TO WHIC:H IT WAS EN'TITLE'D OR CLAIMED
AND BEY'OND 'THE PLEAD'INGS AND PROOF IN
THIS 'CASE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DE'LIVERY ·O'F RES PONDENT'S !CHE·CK IN
THE SUM OF $6,000.00 TO APPE'ULA'N'T CO'NS'TTTU'TE1D A V'OVNTARY AN'D UNCONDITION·AL PAYMENT
ON RESPONDENT'S INDEBTEDNESS TO APPELL.ANT, AND OWNERS'HI'P THEREO~F HA·D TO PASS
TO APPELLA!NT IN ORDER THAT THE IND'EBTEDNESIS WOU:UD THEREBY BE REDUCED BY $'6,000.00.
1

On December 2, 1946 respondent delivered to
appellant its check in the sum of $6,000.00 (Fdg. 7
- R. 1'21). The check itself does not recite what it
was for, nor does it bear any conditions of delivery
('Pl. Exh. ;7) nor wtas there any evidence to show
that its delivery was !accompanied by a letter of
transmittal or statements made at the time of de14
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livery imposing conditions thereon. The trial court
made no finding as to whether it was a payment on
the purchase price of the stock, nor a finding as
to whether the indebtedness of respondent to appellant was thereby or ever reduced. It simply made
a v-ague finding that the ·check was delivered upon
'a tnutual understanding that the proceeds would
be held and invested by appellant until such time
as payments to the United States would 'be required
under appellant's contract with the United States
and to appellant under the then proposed Amendatory Subscription Contract (Fdg. 7 - R. 121).
In spite of what the trial court said or did not
say a;bout it, the $6,000.00 was a payment lby respondent to appellant on the purchase price of the
stock and is a fact accomplished. Likewise the
$6,000.00 reduction of respondent's indebtedness to
appellant by reason of staid payment is a fact acconlplished. This, we submit, is the crux of this lawsuit. Both facts are unequivocally stated as having
been accomplished in a formal instrument in writing, i.e. the Amendatory Subscription ~Contract between respondent 1and appellant dated Fe'bruary 3,
1947, wherein the parties agreed that the total aggregate liability of the respondent to appellant for
the purchase prices of the stock
"... s'hall not exceed the sum of $912,000.00 less $6,000.00 PREVIOUSLY PAID
by the District (respondent) to the Association
(appellant) on the purchase price of the
1'5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

stock." (Emph!asis added) (Pl. Exh. 6, par.
1'5)

Thus, the avowed purpose of the $6,000.00 as formally declared by respondent was a payment and
corresponding reduction in the indebtedness. And
it fits squarely into the elementary definition of a
payment, i.e. the discharge of a debt in whole or in
part, Words And Phrases, Payment, Vol. 31A, Pe1~
manent E~dition, pp. 216, 233. And to constitute payment, money must pass from the debtor to the
creditor for the purpose of extinguishing the d~bt,
and the creditor must receive it for the same purpose. 40 Am. Jur., Payment, Section 4, p. 716; Section 2, p, 715. Having so agreed, avowed and declared, how then can respondent now be heard to
complain that the delivery of the $6,000.00 was not
a payment an'd claim that it was a conditional delivery of money to be used for a special purpose?
Suffice it to say, when the $6,000.00 check was delivered to appellant the money passed to appellant
for the purpose of reducing respondent's indebtedness to appellant and as such became the property
of appellant. It is just that simple, and it cannot
be otherwise.
Respondent conceded in its answer to Interrogatory No. 3 (R. 22) that its indebtedness to appellant was reduced by $6,000.00 at the time the
Amendatory Subscription Contract was entered into.
H1aving thus conceded, that should have put an end
to this controversy without anything further. And
16
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so appellant filed its Motion For Summary Judgment, dated November 26, 1962 (R. 91, 92) supported by the Affidavit of its secretary (R. 28, 29,
30) together with attached Ex·hi'bits "A" to "E",
inclusive (R. 31-80, incl.) 1and Exhibit "F" (R. 9396, incl.), which we submit should have been granted
by the trial court but which was denied ( R. 110) .
This we urge was error.
The tri1al court then went on to ·hear the case
and decide the same without making findings on
whether the $6,000.00 constituted a payment or
whether the respondent's indebtedness had been reduced. The proper application of the law to the
evidence in this case would compel findings in the
affirmative thereon. ·The failure of the trial court to
so do led to its erroneous Judgment in this case,
which we submit must be unequivocally reversed.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED I·N RE,CEIVING EVIDENCE OF CONVERSATI'ONS PRE-DATING THE
Al\IENDATORY S!UBS,CRlPTION C·ONTRACT OF FE·BRUARY 3, 1947 WHI,CH TENDED TO ALTER AND
MODIFY THE TERMS THERE·OF IN Vl'OLATION o~F
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE.

The rights and duties of the parties were fixed
by the terms of the written Amendatory ,Subscription Contract dated February 3, 194'7 as of that
date (Pl. Exh. 6) All of the negotiations, deals, arrangements and the like made prior thereto or contemporaneously therewith pertaining to the subject
matter thereof were merged into that instrument.
17
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The parties thereby agreed that the total indebtedness of the respondent to the app,ellant for the purchase price of the stock shall not exceed the sum of
$912,000.00 (eight percent of $11,400,000.00) less
$6,000.00 previously paid thereon, i.e. $906,000.00
(Pl. Exh. 6, par. I5). Thus the indebtedness incurred by respondent was $6,000.00 less than it
would 'have been 'had the $6,000.00 not been paid.
T'he parties thereby formally agreed that the
$6,000.00 hlad been paid for that very purpose. It
is just that plain. There is no ambiguity to explain.
Nor did the trial court make any finding that the
particular provision of the Amendatory Subscription Contract was ambiguous.
It is elementary that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the provisions of a written contract
unless the contract 'Contains ambiguities which must
be resolved. Davis v. Payne & Day Inc., 10 Utah
(2 d) 53, 348 Pac. f2d) 33'7; Hatch v. Adams, 8
Utah (2d) 82, 3'29 Plac. (2d) 285; Continental Bank
& Trust Company v. Bybee, 6 Utah (2d) 98, 306
Pac. ('2d) 773.
The parol evidence rule forecloses all events
which precede or accompany a written integration.
Wilson v. Gardener, 10 Utah (2d) 89, 348 Pac. (2d)
9'31; Degnan, Rarol Evidence - Utah Version, 5
Utah Law Review 158.
In the instant case the trial court permitted
the witness John 0. Beesley to testify, over appellant's dbjection (Tr. 39) as to a conversation which
1

1

18
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he had with Fisher Harris in Salt Dake City, Utah
shortly after Novem·ber 8, 1946 pertaining to a plan
and scheme of Mr. Beesley for the respondent to
advance $6,000.00 to the appellant to be invested
in government ·bonds with the interest thereon to
accrue to respondent ( Tr. 39-42, incl.). Appellant
moved to strike the entire 'answer of Mr. Beesley
as being violative of the parol evidence rule (Tr.
42, 43), which was ~denied pro forma ('Tr. 43) Appellant renewed its motion to strike the testimony
of the witness /Beesley with respect to the conversation with Fisher Harris as /being violative of the
parol evidence rule ( Tr. 60, 61), which the trial
court denied (Tr. 67). We submit that under the
authorities cited above the trial court erred in rereceiving such parol evidence over the objection of
appellant. In so doing, it permitted respondent to
impeach a provision of a written contract executed
by it over sixteen years ago with all of the formalities of an election and the resolutions of its Board
by the testimony of one witness as to his memory
sixteen years prior.

The fact is that the Amendatory Subscription
Contract is clear and unambiguous in its terms.
There is no ambiguity to explain. The claimed oral
agreen1ent which respondent was successful in persuading the trial court to enforce imposes upon appellant the duties of a trustee, requires it to keep
the $6,000.00 invested at the highest rate of interest ·consistent with safety, holds it accountable to
19
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respondent for the interest earned on the investment, requires it to hold the $6,000.00 and all interest thereon separate and apart from all other
moneys of appellant, and requires it to give respondent credit for 1all interest on any payments, whether
classed as installments, assessments or otherwise,
which may hereafter become due to appellant from
respondent. How can it be said that this does not
impose duties and obligations on appellant in addition to those it assumed under the written contract?
The additional duties and obligations imposed on
appellant thereby clearly alter, if not repudiate, the
express written terms of the Amendatory Subscription Contract. In addition thereto, it gives the respondent more than it bargained for, i.e. the interest
earned on money already paid under the express
terms of the Amendatory Subscription Contract to
appellant on the purchase price of the stock.
'To say that such an oral agreement merely explains the particular provision of the written contract is absurd, particularly where there is no ambiguity to explain. On the contrary, the claimed
oral agreement not only alters !and modifies the
terms of the written contract but completely and
radically changes it in purpose land effect, if not
repudiates it. This is a classic example of the wisdom i'n the parol evidence rule, which !appropriately
has become known as a "common sense rule". Jensen
Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah (2d) ·276, 323 Pac. (2d)
2'59. Under no circumstances was parol evidence of
20
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the conversations admissible in this case, and the
tt·ial court clearly erred in receiving such evidence
0\"Pl' the olJjection Of 'appellant.
POINT III.
TIIERE IS NO COMPETE'NT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS O·F THE TRIAL COURT THAT
THE $6,000.00 WAS CONDITIONALLY DELIVERED
TO APPELLANT UPON A MUTUA:L UNDERSTANDING TI-IAT THE SAME WOULD BE INVESTED AND
THE INTEREST RECEIVED FROM SUCH INVESTMENT \YOtTLD ACCRUE TO RESPONDENT OR THAT
APPELLAN'T WAS BO·UND THERE BY.
1

In spite of the fact that the trial court erroneously received parol eviden·ce to show that a
claimed ortal agreement or understan'ding had been
reached between respondent and appellant, respondent still offered no competent evidence from which
the trial court could find that the $6,000.00 check
\vas delivered to appellant upon a mutual understanding that the proceeds would be held land invested by appellant until such time as payment to
the United States would be required under appellant's contract with the United States and that the
interest received from such investment would accrue
to the credit of respondent.
The only evidence offered by respondent 1as to
the claimed oral agreement prior to the execution of
the Amendatory Subscription Contract of February 3, 1947 was the testimony of the Witness John
0. Beesley, over appellant's objection (Tr. '39), relating to one conversation with Fisher Harris, one
21
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of ap·pellant's directors and its counsel, shortly after
November 8, 1946 (Tr. 39-4'2, incl.). The testimony
of Fisher Harris refutes any such conversation
(Tr. 108), although apparently the trial court chose
to believe Mr. Beesley. Mr. Beesley testified that
he had :a meeting with Mr. Harris shortly after
November 8, 1946 in Salt Lake City, Utah and that
only he and Mr. Harris were present (Tr. 40). 'Mr.
Beesley testified that he suggested a plan or scheme
to Mr. Harris whereby respon·dent could avoid exceeding its debt limitation by 1a d van c in g the
$6,000.00 to appellant and that the money be invested in government bonds and the interest accrue
to the respondent (·Tr. 41). Mr. Beesley was unable
to state the substance of the statements of Mr. Har··
ris in response thereto (Tr. 41, 42), but merely
suggested th1at it met with the approval of Mr.
Harris (Tr. 42). Appellant moved to strike the
entire answer of Mr. Beesley as not binding on appellant (Tr. 4'2), which was den'ied pro forma (Tr.
43). Appellant renewed its motion to strike the
testimony of the witness ·Beesley with respect to the
conversation with Fis'her Harris individually as not
binding on appell1ant corporation (Tr. 59, 60), which
was denied (Tr. 67).
Even assuming what Mr. Beesley said to be
true, which apparently the trial court believed, certainly the appellant corporation is not bound by any
oral "1approval" by director Harris (which he denies) given during a conference solely between him
22

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and the witness John 0. Beesley. The law is well
settled that in order to bind a corporation the Board
must act as a Board, either in a regular session or
speci1al session called for a purpose. Lockwitz v.
P'ine Tree Mine & Mill Company, 37 Uta'h 349, 108
Pac.1128, Jackson v. Bonneville Irrigation District,
66 Utah 404, 243 Pac. 107. The then existing Section 18-2-20, ·utah Code Annotated 1943 specifically provided that ~the corporate powers of the corporation shall be exercised by the Board of Directors. An~d in 19 Am. Jur., Corporations, Sectio·n
91,8, p. 909 it is stated:
uThe authority of the directors or trustees is conferred upon them as a board, and
they can bind the corporation only by acting
together as 1a board. A majority of them in
their individual names cannot act for the
board itself and bind the corporation. In
order to exercise their powers they must meet
so that they may hear each other's views, deli'berate, and then decide ... "
·Thus, respondent cannot rely on the 1alleged conversation between the witness John 0. Beesley and
director Harris as binding on the appellant corporation, and it was error for the trial court to attempt
to so bind the appellant corpor!ation. Th·at being the
only evidence offered by respondent to support its
claim that such an oral agreement had been reached
prior to the execution of the Amendatory Subscription iContract, the finding of the trial court thereon
cannot stand ~and must be set aside.
23
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We are mindful of the rule that the trial court
as the trier of the fact ·has great latitude in determining the truth of the facts in iss.ue. However, in
so doing it cannot rely on incompetent evidence and
close its eyes to competent evidence which is undisputed. Thus, in the instant case all of the documentary evidence as to the events which led up to the
execution of the Amendatory Su'bscription Contract
on February 3, 1'94 7 negative any agreement or understanding between the parties prior to the execution thereof with respect to the accrual of interest
on the $6,000.00 payment. Respondent's own records
negative this.
Thus, in the minutes of the meeting of the Board
of Directors of respondent dated November 20, 1946
(Df. Exh. 2'5) where the proposed Amendatory Subscription Contract was approved by respondent, including the payment of $6,000.00, no reference is
made therein pertaining to the investment or accrual of interest on the $6,000.00. Nor does the Ordinlance passed ·by respondent on November 20, 194·6
fDf. Exh. 24) and submitted to a vote of its electorate on December 4, 1946 (Df. Exh. 2'5) make any
reference to the investment of the $6,000.00 or to
the accrual of interesit thereon. In fact, the Ordinance told the people of the resporulent District that
the $6,000.00 had been paid to the appellant and its
indebtedness to appellant had been reduced by that
amount.
24
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Furthermore, no reference is made to the investment of the $6,000.00 nor to the accrual of interest
to respondent in the minutes of
Board of Directors' meeting of appellant on November 8, 1946 (Df. Exh. 26), although Mr. Beesley noted that a problem
would arise as to respondent's exceeding its
debt limitation;
Special Stockholders' meeting of appellant dated December 20, 1946 (Df. Exh. 27),
wherein the supplemental contract between
appellant and the United States was approved
by the stockholders;
Special Board of Directors' meeting of
appellant on December ~20, 1946 (Df. Exh.
28), wherein the execution of the supplemental contl:'!act between appellant and the United
States was approved; or the
Board of Directors' meeting of appellant
on February 5, 1'947 (Df. Exh. 31).
However, at the annual Stockholders' meeting
of appell~t on February 5, 194 7 attended by Mr.
Beesley, representing respondent (Df. Exh. 29), it
was unanimously resolved by all of the stockholders,
including respondent, that the amount of $6,000.00
be credited to the account of respondent on its contractual obligation for the purchase of stock in the
appelllant and that it be deducted from the first
contract assessments. This meeting was only two
25
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days after the execution of the Amendatory Subscription Contract, and still no mention was m1ade
of the so-called prior agreement or understanding
to invest the $6,000.00 and credit the interest thereon to respondent. It is in·conceivable that if such
a prior agreement was reached that respondent
would not even mention it, and then vote in favor
of the foregoing resolution without s,uch agreement's
being incorporated therein. It was only at a subsequent meeting, being nearly six weeks after the
execution of the Amendatory Subscription Contract,
that the matter of investing the $6,000.00 and the
accrual of interest to the credit of the respondent
was first mentioned in 1any minute or document
(Pl. Exh. 1, p. 3). Although we might now criticize
the motion contained in the foregoing minutes as
being unwise, in law and in fact the effect thereof
can only be a gratuity for which no consideration
was given 1and has since been revoked by appellant
as will be hereinafter demonstrated. Suffice it to
say the foregoing resolution forms the basis for
respondent's contentions in this case. It should be
obvious from all of the documentary evidence that
the alleged o~al agreement is simply a figment of
somebody's imagination and came as an afterthought to the purely gratuitous motion approved
by appell1ant's directors on March 14, 1947.
P0'INT. IV.
THE 'CLAI'MED OiRAL AGRE.EMENT WOULD BE
VOID AS BEING AN ILLEGAL CONTRACT TO VIOLATE THE PROVISIO·NS 'OF THE THEN EXISTING
1
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SECTION 100-10-18 (g), UTAH CODE ANNOTATE'D
19·13, AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT IN ENFORCING THE
SAME.

The trial court found that respondent ~deliv
Pred to appellant its check in the sum of $6,000.00
pursuant to an oral agreement under the terms of
which the proceeds would be held and invested by
appellant until such time as payments to the United
States would be required under appellant's contract
with the United States, with the interest received
from such investment to accrue to the credit of respondent ( Fdgs. 6, 7 - Tr. 121 ) . By its Judgment
the ~trial court purports to enforce such oral agreemen (Judgment-Tr. 125).
We can only conclude therefrom that the indebtedness of respondent to appellant has not yet
been reduced by $6,000.00, nor will it so be reduced
until ~ppellant levies an assessment against its
stockholders to obtain the funds necessary to make
appellant's first annual payment to the United
States under the $11,400,000.00 contract (Pl. Exh.
5). Yet unless respondent's indebtedness to appellant was reduced by $6,000.00 at some time prior
to the execution of the Amendatory Subscription
Contract dated February 3, 1947 the indebtedness
incurred by respondent thereby exceeded respondent's debt limitation imposed by the then existing
Section 100-10-18 (g), Utah Code Annotated ~943
by the sum of $6,000.00. This we repeatedly called
to the attention of the trial court, which it inten27
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tionally ignored ('Tr. 22, 30). That section fixed a
limitation on the !aggregate inde'btedness of metropolitan water districts at 107o of the assessed valuation of all taxable property within the district. It
was amen~ded in 1957 to exclude any indebtedness
to a water users association (appellant) from which
the district procures water. Section 73-8-18 (g),
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Laws of
Utah 1957, Chapter 159, Section 1.
The fundamental purpose in p a y i n g the
$6,000.00 to appellant ~at that time was to avoid respondent's exceeding its statutory debt limitation.
R~espondent so alleges in its Complaint (Complaint,
par. 6 - Tr. 4, 5). So states the resolution adopted
by appellant's stockholders, including respondent
('Df. Exh. 29, p. 3). The witness John 0. Beesley,
as chairman of the Board of Directors of respondent~
so testified ('Tr. 37) an·d the trial court so found
( Fdg. 6, R. 121). That being so, the very purpose
and effect of the claimed oral agreement found by
the trial court would violate the then existing Section 100-10-18 (g), Utah Code Annotated 194'3.
Yet the trial court enforced the cl1aimed oral agreement in spite of the law adopted in this state and
in the whole country that every contract in violation
of law is void. T·hus, in the case of Baker v. Latses,
60 Utah 38, 206 Pac. 553, this court states on page
555 of the Pacific Reporter:

"It is the generally accepted ·doctrine of
this country that every contract in violation
28
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of law is void. It is equally true that our
courts will not lend their aid to the enforcetnent nor permit a recovery of compensation
under contl'lacts made and entered into in violation of the law prohibiting them or declaring them to be unlawful." (Citing H1addock
v. Salt Lake City, 23 Utah 521, 65 Pac. 491)
Under the claimed oral agreement which the
trial court saw fit to enforce ownership of the
$6,000.00 could not under ·any circumstance pass
to appellant. That being so, there could be no cor. .
responding reduction in the indelbtedness of respondent to appellant. All that could pass to appellant
\vould be the bear legal title with ·conditions imposed,
and the equitable title would remain in the respondent. 54 Am. Jur., Trusts, Section 96, p. 89; Sectior;~
98, p. 90. And so we ask, under whlat possible theory
could such a transaction operate to reduce the indebtedness of respondent to appellant? We submit
that there is none.
Nor can it be said that the payment of the
$6,000.00 to ap·pellant operated las a reduction of
some other indebtedness of respondent. Respondent
was not, and is not indebted to the United States
for respondent's share of the cost of the Project.
No con.tract exists between respondent and the
United States whereby respondent is or ever was
obligated to pay one red cent to the United States
on this Project. Furthermore, the money was not
paid over to the United States. Respondent's indebtedness is, and always has been to the appellant un29
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der the original and Amendatory Stock Subscription C:ontract. Appellant is the one which is solely
indebted to the United States and is the only one
to whom the United States can look for payment.
Respondent apparently concedes that its indebtedness to appellant was reduced by $6,000.00 at the
time the Amendatory Subscription ·contract dated
February 3, 1947 was entered in·to (R. 22). It makes
this concession lap·parently in an effort to avoid having exceeded its debt limitation, and at the same
time asserts that it ·has retained the equitable ownership of the $6,000.00 and all benefits accruing
therefrom. We respectfully submit that the two
cannot co-exist. The former is conclusively established by the record before this court. The l1atter is
predicated upon a claimed oral agreement which is
not only contrary to the express provisions of the
written Amendatory Subscription Contract but, if
ever made, would be clearly illegal as a violation of
the debt limitation statute and as such the trial court
erred in enforcing the same.
POIN'T V.
THE CLAIMEID ORAL AGREEME·NT WOULD
NUIJLIFY THE E'LECTION OF THE VOTERS OF RES1PONDENT DISTRI~c·T HELD ON DE'CEMBE·R 4, 1946
TO APPR·OVE THE PRO,POSED AMENDATORY SUBsrCRIPTION CONTRACT A"ND WOULD VOID THE
AMENDATORY SUBSIC·RIPTION CONTRACT DATED
FE B R'UARY 3 ' 1947 AND THE EXE'CUTION THEREOF.
1

1

.

On December 2, 1946 respondent delivered to
appellant its check in the amount of $6,000.00. Two
30
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days later the proposition voted on by the electorate

of the respondent District on December 4, 1946 was
as follows:
"Shall the Metropolitan Water District
of Provo City be authorized to enter into an
amendatory contract with the Provo River
\\rater Users' Association for the purpose of
continuing construction of the Deer Creek Division of the Provo River Prdject for accruing a water supply for the Distirct, on terms
and conditions set forth in the ordinance by
which this election is called? (Emphasis added) ( Df. Exh. 24, Ordinance, Section ·9)
The foregoing Ordinance set out verbatim the
terms of the proposed Amendatory Subscription Contract, including the whole of paragraph 15 (Df. Exh.
24). Section 13 of the foregoing Ordinance required
publication thereof in a newspaper or posting the
same in three ·public places. Section 14 thereof required that a copy of the Ordinance be posted in a
conspicuous position in each polling place and each
voting ·booth. The Ordin1ance told the people that
$6,000.00 ·had been paid to appellant on the purchase
price of the stock and that the indebtedness had been
reduced by that amount. It was upon those terms
and conditions that the majority of the electorate
voted in fuvor of the proposition and approved the
Amendatory Subscription Contract (Df. Exh. 25).
And it is conceivable that had the terms and conditions been otherwise the voters would have rejected
the proposition.
Pursuant to the mandate of its voters, the
Board of Directors of the respondent District auth31
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orized the execution of the Amendatory Subscription Contract (Df. Exh. 2'5). Having told its voters
thJat the $6,000.00 'had been paid and by reason
thereof the indebtedness had been reduced by that
amount, 1and having so agreed in the Amendatory
Subscription Contract, how can respon·dent be heard
to now say otherwise?
For the trial court to now find that by reason
of the oral agreement respondent had not in fact
made a payment of $6,000.00 on the purchase price
of the stock, with no corresponding reduction in its
indebtedness, is not only contrary to the express
language of the Amendatory Subscription Contract
but is in effect a determination that the Amendatory
Subscription Contr1act obligated respondent for an
in,debtedness of $6,000.00 more than the electorate
approved and $6,000.00 more than the Board of Directors of the respondent District authorized its officers to incur. We point this out not by way of
urging that this court hold that the Amendatory
Subscription Contract is void, but to point out the
fallacy of respondent's theory of the case 'and the
dilemma created by the Findings, Conclusions and
Judgment of the trial court.
POINT VI.

RESPONDENT A~CQUIRED N'O RIGHTS IN AND
TO THE INTEREST A:CCRUALS FROM THE INVESTM,ENT OF THE $6,000.00 'PAYMENT BY REASON OF
THE MOTION PASSED AT THE APPELLANT DIRECT101RS' MEETING OF MAR·OH 14, 1947.

'On March 14, 1947, being six weeks after
32

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the execution of the Amendatory Subscription Contract, the Board of 'Directors of appellant corporation passed the following motion:
"It was moved by attorney Harris that
the $6,000.00 paid 'by the Metropolitan Water
District of Provo on its su'bscriptron contract
be not mingled with the Association's general
funds, but that it be placed in a separate a·ccount and invested at the highest rate of interest consistent with safety; the president,
treasurer and Mr. Beesley be and are ·hereby
authorized to make the investment and report
their ·action. Interest on the investment to accrue to the credit of the Metropolitan Water
Di'strict." (Fdgs. 9, 10 - 'R. 12·2; Pl. Exh. 1,
p. 3)

Prior to that date nothing appeared in any of
the documentary evidence as to the investment of
the $6,000.00 or the accrual of interest thereon to
the credit of respondent. 'The trial court foun·d that
the foregoing resolution was made ''in recognition
of and in pursuance of the mutual understanding
referred to herein ... " and undoubtedly this resolution was influential, if not determinative, in the decision of the trial court. What the trial court refused to consider is that ·all of the negotiations, arrangements and the like which occurred prior to or
contemporaneously with the execution of the Amendatory 'Subscription Contr1act merged into that contract and are past history. Appellant raised a timely objection thereto (Tr. H2), which the trial court
denied ('Tr. 33) .
1
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We can only look to the terms of the Amendatory
Subscription Contract to ascertain the rights, duties
and obligations of the partie'S thereto as of February 3, 19'4 7 pertaining to the subject matter of
the contract. Any subsequent enforceable agreement
must stand or fall on a new consideration or lacl{
of consideration. The record is clear that the fore ..
going motion was not founded on any consideration's passing from re'Spondent to appellant. No evidence was offered by respondent to show that any
consideration passed, an·d we do not believe that respondent se,riously contends otherwise. Yet re'spondent urged th1at the trial court invoke its powers
of equity to find some equitable principal under
which respondent might be entitled to the interest
earned on appellant's investment, i.e. that either an
implied or constructive contract or a resulting trust
'had been created by reason of appellant's actions.
However, respondent ignores the elementary concept th·at each and every equitable principle must
be founded on a valuable consideration. 12 Am. Jur.,
Contracts, Section 6, p. 504; 54 Am. Jur., Trusts,
Section 194, p. 153.
We might now criticize the resolution adopted
by appellant on March 14, 1947 as being unwise, but
in law and in fact the effect thereof can only be an
intention to make a gift at some time in the future
and it ·has since been revoked by appellant (24 Am.
Jur., Gifts, Section 2, pp. 730, 731; Section 38, P·
752). Revocation of any prior intention of making
34
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a gift is manifested in the minutes of the appellant
Directors' meetings held on March 11, 1955 (Pl.
Exh. 8, p. 2), again on April 8, 1960 (Df. Exh. 30,
p. 1) and was expressly revoked at the appellant's
Directors' meeting of April 20, 1962, as amended
May 18, 1962 (Pl. Exh. 21, p. 5).
Furthermore, appellant had no power to make
a gift. 13 Am. J1tr., Corporations, Section 806, p.
Bf!O. It would be akin to a charitable gift by ·a noncharitable corporation, which are generally held to
be ultra vires unless beneficial to the corporation.
l!nion Pac-ific Railro(l;d Company v. Trustees, Inc.,
8 Utah (2d) 101, 329 Pac. (2d) 398. Appellant
certainly would not benefit therefrom. The then existing Section TS-2-16, Uta;h Code Annotated 194·3
(Section 16-2-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953) did
not expressly empower corporations organized thereunder to make a gift, ·and ~a strict interpretation
is to be given to the express powers of a corporation. Zions Savings Bank & Trust Company v. Tropic
and East Fork Irrigation Company, 102 Utah 101,
126 Pac. (2d) 1053; Summit Range & Livestock
Co. v. Rees, 1 Utah ('2d) 195, 265 Pac. f2d) 381.
Nor does the resolution of appellant's Board
of Directors dated March 14, 1'947 constitute a ratification of the claimed oral agreement since to be
an effective ratification by the corporation it must
be ru!Companied ·by an intent to ratify the unauthorized transaction. 13 Am. Jur., Corporations, Section
977, p. 990. No mention is made therein that a prior
35
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oral agreement had been made which the corporation was thereby intending to ratify, nor is there
any evidence at 1any place in the record manifesting
such intent. Furthermore, the claimed prior oral
!agreement would be an agreement to violate the debt
limitation statute as demonstrated under Point lV
above, and a corpoiiation cannot ratify a contract
which is -illegal or opposed to public policy. 13 Am.
Jur., Corporations, Section 980, p. 932; 7 A.L.R.

1446, 1494.
Admittedly, the foregoing resolution, its creation and existence are difficult to explain. The witness Fisher Harris, who made the motion, has no
independent recollection of the f1acts or circumstances which surrounded or prompted the motion
('Tr. 111). He did testify, however, that when the
Amendatory Subscription ·Contract was executed on
February 3, 1947 it was expected that the payments
under the $11,400,000.00 contract would begin in
the near future ( Tr. 11'7) . We can only surmise that
it was not expected to raccumulate enough interest
over which to argue.
However, when the "excess costs" contract was
executed on February 2, 1949, thereby suspending
payments by the appellant to the United States under the $11,400,000.00 contract before they began,
the interest attri'buted to the investment of the
$6,000.00 began to accumul1ate and reached the sum
of $'2,2·58.'92 as of December 31, 1961. In principle
the amount of the accumulated interest should have
36
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no bearing on this controversy. However, as a practical matter it did.
And having once reached the litigation stage,
the rights, duties and obligations of the parties must
be settled on accepted principles of law and not on
the basis of a gratuitous resolution appearing in
the records of the appellant, which can only have
the legal effect of a declaration of an intention to
make a gift at some time in the future. No enforceable rights were created in respondent thereby and
the trial court clearly erred in 1attempting to enforce the same.
POINT VII.
THE TRIAL COURT ER!RE'D IN MAKING FINDINGS OF FA:CT NOS. 9 'TO 14, INCUUSIVE, A:S TO
EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE EXEOUTI 0'N O'F
THE AMENDATO'RY SUBSCRIPTlON CON'TRAC'T BETWEEN THE PARTIES DATE'D FE'BRU'ARY 3, 1947.
1

'The only purpose for which evidence of events
subsequent to the Amendatory 'Subscription Contract could be offered would be to s·how that the
Amendatory Subscription ·Contract thereafter had
been amended or that new rights and duties of the
parties h~d been created with reference to the
$6,000.00. However, such evidence was not offered
by respondent for that purpose but was offered for
the purpose of showing a "confirmation of a prior
understanding (Tr. 3'2, 50). Appellant made timely
objections to all of such evidence ( Tr. 3'2, 50, 51),
whieh objections the trial court ·denied ('Tr. 3:3, 51,
52).
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Even so, respondent cannot successfully clain1
that the Amendatory Subscription Contract dated
February 3, 1947 was amended by the resolution of
appellant's Board of Directors ·dated March 14, 1947.
No cons} deration passed therefor. The minute entry ·does not constitute an agreement or contract
which would be binding on appell1ant. It is unila:teral
and nowhere in the record does it appear that the
Board of iDirectors of the respondent District thereafter approved, agreed thereto or even commented
thereon. It was strictly a declaration of intention
by the Board of Directors of !appellant to at most
make a gift to respondent at some time in the future.
w~hat is more, the Board of Directors of appellant
had no authority to bind the corporation to such a
declaration. And so, with the entries m1ade by the
auditors employed 'by appellant to make the auditor's
reports. Certainly they ·have no power to bind ~the
appellant by employing inept language sounding in
legal opinions. Furthermore, the record does not
show th1at such auditor's reports were ever formally
approved by the Board of Directors of appellant.
In fact, the testimony of the witness Jo'hn '0. Beesley
shows affirmatively that no formal board action
was taken thereon (Tr. 56).
The trial court m1ade no finding that the Amendatory Subscription Contract dated February 3,
1947 had been amended by the resolution of the
Board of Directors of appellant, nor that any new
rigllts, duties or obligations of the parties were ere'38
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ated thereby. Thus, Findings Nos. 9 through 14,
inclusive, covering events subsequent to the execution of the Amendatory Su'bscription Contract dated
February 3, 1947 are immaterial and it was error
for the trial court to make findings thereon as a
basis for its Conclusions Of :Law and Judgment.
POIN'T VIri.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS JUDGMENT :BY
GRANTING RELIEF TO RESPONDE'NT BEY·ON·D
THAT TO WHI,CH IT WAS EN'TITLED OR CLAIMED
A~ BEYOND THE PLEADINGS AND 'PROOF IN
THIS CASE.

The affirmative relief sought by respondent in
its Complaint was to compel appellant to hold the
$6,000.00 and all interest accumulations thereon to
respondent's credit and to pay over such amounts
to the United States when, as and if moneys become due and payable from appellant to the United
States under appellant's contract with the United

States.
The Judgment of the trial court went far beyond, and orders appell1ant to
(a) keep the $6,000.00 invested at the
highest rate of interest consistent with safety;
'(b) pay the $6,000.00 over to the United States when payments become due to the
United States by appellant, and give respondent credit for $6,000.00 on the first payment
which will become due to !appellant by respondent under respondent's contract with appellant; and
39
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(c) give respondent credit for any interest and dividends heretofore or hereafter
received by ·appellant attributable to the investment of the $6,000.00, including interest
on interest, on any payments, whether classed as in·stallments, assessments or otherwise
which may hereafter become due to appellant'
by respondent under respondent's stock subscription contract with appellant.
At no point during the tri1al of this case did
respondent claim more than the right to require appellant to pay the $6,000.00 and any earnings thereon over to the United States when the first installment became ·due from appellant to the United
States on the $11,400,000.00 contract (Tr. 4, 14,
15, 16, 18, 71, 72, 75 and 76). Yet the trial court
went much further and made the appellant an investor for the respondent, and conceivably liable
for any loss resulting from a bad investment; 1and
requires appellant to give respondent credit to 'the
extent of the accumulated income on any assessment, whethe·r it be one for operation and maintenance or some purely corpo11ation expense or otherwise, whenever and in whatever amount thereof res:pondent may see fit to ask for a credit. 'The Judgment does not even permit appellant to pay the
money over to the United States now and relieve
itself of \the fiduciary duties imposed on it by the
tri1al court.
We are mindful that under Rule 54 (c), Utah
1
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Rules of Civil Procedure the Judgment shall grant
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is
rendered is entitled even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. However, this
rule does not permit an adju·dication of an issue
which was never raised at the pleading stage or during the trial of the case which the defendant was
never called upon to meet. Taylor v. E. M. Royle
Corporation, 1 Utah (2d) 17'5, 264 P!ac. ('2·d) 2'79.
In the instant case no issue was ever raised as to
the right of respondent to receive a credit for the
interest accumulations on any assessment except
the one which will be levied by appellant to raise
sufficient funds to pay the first installment to the
United States on the $11,400,000.00 contract. Never
did it claim the right to credit the interest !accumulations on assessments levied for operation and
maintenance or general corporate expense. It follows
that the Judgment of the trial court in grantin~g respondent relief beyond the pleadings and proof in
this case must be reversed.
1

CONCLUSION
The $6,000.00, when mlade, was a payment on
the purchase price of the stock. The indebtedness
of respondent to appellant was thereby reduced by
$6,000.00. The parties so agreed in the formal written Amendatory ·subscription Contract. As such the
$6,000.00 became the property of appellant and as
owner thereof appellant was entitled to any income
derived from the investment thereof.
41
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When respondent paid the $6,000.00 it got exactly what it bargained for, i.e. a reduction in its
inde'btedness to appellant by $6,000.00, as the Amendatory Subscription Contract expressly provides,
and nothing more nor anything less. Respondent
isn't out anything save and except a profit earned
on appellant's investment. Nor ·has appellant gained
anything a;t the expense of respon·den t.
'T·he avowed purpose in respondent's paying the
$6,000.00 to appellant was to avoid incurring M
indebtedness in excess of respondent's statutory debt
limitation. Any cla'imed agreement, the effect of
which would not reduce respondent's indebtedness
by the $6,000.00 paid, would be an illegal contract
to violate the ·debt limitation statute. The claimed
oral agreement enforced by the trial court has just
that illegal effect. Furthermore, the effect thereof
would nullify the election of the voters of respondent District and would void the execution of the
Amendatory Subscription Contract by exceeding the
statutory debt limitation of respondent and the
authority granted to the officers of respondent to
execute the same.
The rights, duties and obligations of the parties
pertaining to the $6,000.00 were determined and
fixed by the Amen·datory Subscription Contract as
of February 3, 1947. The trial ·court erred in receiving ·evidence of conversations prior thereto as
attempting to alter and imp~ach the applicable provision of the formal written contract.
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There was no competent evidence offered to
support the claimed oral agreement enforced by
the trial court. All of the documentary evidence
negatives any such agreement's having been m1ade.
It hinges solely on one claim~ed conversation with
one of the directors of appellant which, if had, is
not binding on the corporation.
The action taken by the directors~ of appellant
corporation six weeks subsequent to the execution
of the written contr~act has no legal effect. It does
not make out an enforceable contract since it was
a unilateral declaration for which no consideration
passed. Nor was it a ratification of a prior unauthorized act, since no intent to ratify is manifested therein and in any event appellant corporation could not ratify an illegal contract.
The Findin·gs Of Fact are not supported by
competent evidence and the Conclusions Of Law and
Judgment grants respondent relief beyond that ever
claimed and beyond the pleadings and proof in this
case.
e respectfully submit that the record in this
case compels setting aside the Findings Of Fact,
Conclusions Of Law and the unequivocal reversal
of the Judgment of the trial court.

'V

Respectfully submitted,
JOSEPH NOVAK
520 Continenta:l Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410'1
Attorney for
Defendant-Appellant
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